Understanding the Case for Staying In Iraq

We’ve heard from the neocons that we, meaning the American military, need to maintain a presence in Iraq “until the job is done”. This opinion is often derided by both the political left and constitutionalist conservatives, albeit for different reasons. The leftists use their typical anti-war knee-jerk response to any conflict, alleging that the current administration is involved in the conflict because of reasons varying from the administration’s desire for control over the oil reserves to the advancement of the interests of big businesses to outright racism. Obviously, the constitutionalist conservatives have differing reasons for opposing a continuing American presence in Iraq. These reasons usually involve the lack of constitutionality in the current campaigns in which we're involved.

The current War in Iraq is unique in that it has placed the constitutionalists and the political left on the same side of a major issue, isolating the neoconservatives as essentially the sole supporters of the conflict. This is even more interesting because the constitutionalists usually consider the neoconservatives and the leftists to be different sides of the same coin on most issues. As a traditional conservative myself, I would sooner ally myself politically with a neoconservative before a leftist, so what makes my alleged fellow “conservatives” support this conflict?

One main argument that I hear from neoconservatives is the claim that there will be “chaos” when the US military leaves. This claim always neglects the fact that it was the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government and the dismantling of the Iraqi Army by US forces that brought about the current state of chaos in the first place. Most neocons will admit that there were no weapons of mass destruction, as claimed by George W. Bush prior to the invasion. Their claim is then based upon the opinion that America has a commitment to uphold, namely the establishment of a secure, safe, and democratic Iraq, since we upended Iraqi society in almost every way.

From a military perspective, this opinion is valid; a military perspective eliminates the feel-good alleged moral obligation that neoconservatives like to cite. Parallels have been made between the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Vietnam War. There are many parallels that can be validly drawn, but militarily, the conflicts are very nearly interchangeable: the mighty American military is in conflict with a shapeless entity that does not follow the rules of conventional warfare, thereby causing the American military to have a lot of trouble gaining ground and winning decisive victories. This is because the American military is not fighting an organized army, like in the two World Wars. America is, again, in conflict with guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists, who are essentially different names for the same type of enemy.

In conventional warfare, two organized armies seek each other out and fight each other with the purpose of either eliminating the opposition or driving them out of key strategic locations until the capitulation of the opponent. In conventional warfare, America is still unmatched. America’s combination of massive potential manpower, cutting-edge technology, and rapid deployment of forces on a global scale essentially assures a victory over any other conventional fighting force.

So why, then, is the American military having such a difficult time adjusting to IED’s (Improvised Explosive Devices), of all things? To put it simply, the American military still needs to improve its counterinsurgency tactics. Guerrilla warfare is nothing new; we as Americans used it in the French and Indian Wars, and in our own Revolutionary War, to some extent. After we established ourselves as the premiere conventional fighting force in the first two World Wars, we started getting involved in conflicts against guerrillas and insurgents. The difficulties fighting against this enemy came to a head in the Vietnam War. We did learn many lessons about this new unconventional style of warfare, though, and General David Petraeus, who wrote his dissertation on those lessons learned, began applying those lessons in Iraq during the so-called surge.

Conflicts which pitted guerrillas against a conventional army have proven this quote: “A guerrilla wins if he does not lose; the occupying force loses if it does not win completely.” At first glance, this quote seems extremely obvious. However, the underlying meaning in that quote explains fully the reason to remain in Iraq.

If the occupying forces in Iraq are withdrawn before the newly-formed Iraqi armed forces are prepared to deal with the insurgency, it will only be a matter of time before the insurgents inflict enough damage to force a capitulation by the Iraqi army and an abdication by the current Iraqi government. The greatest threat to a victory by the occupying force is rarely the insurgency itself; rather, it is the loss of political will that will lead to the withdrawal of the occupying force that usually grants the insurgents victory. Through perseverance and attrition, the occupying force can win the war against the insurgents. When the political leadership of the occupying military and the people back home are detached from the conflict, however, political will is always in danger of slipping away as more soldiers in the occupying force are killed and more resources are used in the conflict. One can observe this very thing happening during the Vietnam War and the current Iraq War.

In hindsight, we can safely say that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a mistake. George Bush made a bad call based on faulty intelligence. No matter how much of a mistake it may have been, though, it was indeed a commitment, especially after we completely dismantled Iraq’s government and military. So what, now, do we do? We could pull out all forces as quickly as possible, as advocated by many constitutionalists. It’s highly probable that the Iraqi security forces will be unable to deal with insurgent forces, and the characteristics of the Vietnam War would have been successfully and wholly repeated. In Vietnam, even when we and our allies were within sight of victory, we pulled all support before our South Vietnamese allies were adequately self-sufficient (because the US lost its political will to continue the fight), and they were eventually destroyed. The same could very well happen in Iraq, resulting in another potentially radical Islamic state in the Middle East.

Despite this, though, how many more Americans will we have to sacrifice before we can consider Iraq “secure”? We all have a tough choice to make. If Iraq collapses into a radical Islamic state, then the trillions of dollars and the thousands of American lives lost would be for naught. And, no, “taking out” Saddam Hussein doesn’t level that field. What would have been the point of removing Saddam from power and having him executed if his oppressive, secular regime is replaced by an even more oppressive Islamist one?

There is the undeniable fact that the United States faces no direct attack from any state in the Middle East. The threats to our national security come from groups such as al Qaeda, an organization without borders or uniformed armies. Our options are threefold, as I see it. The first two options could lead to the destruction of al Qaeda; the third option does not.

Option 1: An all-out, no-holds-barred offensive. No punches will be pulled. Wherever a single al Qaeda unit resides, we will decimate them and anyone supporting them, without regard to the sovereignty of the nations in which al Qaeda is operating. It would essentially boil down to an unprecedented assault on the entire Islamic world. Combined with a ruthless crackdown on Islamic populations in Europe and the US, we would strike the hearts of all Islamic people with the fear of God. It would be the ultimate example of preemptive warfare, and with our current nuclear and conventional warfare capabilities, we could do it. The draft would have to be reinstated and the cost could reach the hundreds of trillions. We would probably have to do it alone, too, although a few allies might pop up. However, this option would be the most surefire way to eliminate a very real enemy to the Western world. Our ways of life and cultures will be much more preserved and secured.

Option 2: Continue on our current policy path. Confront Islamic/Muslim states diplomatically when they do something that threatens our interests, attack al Qaeda when they pop up into our sights, and promote pro-Western democracy. This option leaves open the possibility that we will never get out of the region, and the increasing assertiveness of Muslims in Europe could prove a huge problem to these efforts in the long run. This option also does not guarantee that we won’t be attacked by Islamic fundamentalists again.

Option 3: Withdrawal all military assets from the area. Reduce (or even eliminate) military aid to Israel. Basically give the Islamists nothing to complain about, nor anything to fight with us about. Like Option Two, this option does not guarantee that we won’t be attacked by Islamic fundamentalists again, but no more Americans will die in the immediate conflict, and huge sums of American money will be saved in the coming years.

Which option is the right option? Unfortunately, only history will tell us that. Option Three most certainly seems to be in the best interest of Americans. Option One has the potential to eliminate a great threat to the entire Western world, but at a potentially great cost. Option Two is proven by history to be the most sensible path to achieve an acceptable balance of peace and prosperity (specifically for Americans), albeit also with a cost.

It’s all mighty complicated, for sure. It’s very easy to get caught up in the rhetoric of politicians who call for the entire spectrum of options, but every option has positive and negative consequences. An appropriate balance must be found, because getting bogged down in a counterinsurgency war could possibly be eclipsed by us all getting bogged down in indecision and doubt about what to do.

- Alex Lee